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NOTES
APPORTIONMENT BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND INCOME OF CORPORATE Dm-
DENDS DERIVED FROM THE SALE OF UNPRODUCTiVE REALTY-The equitable
rights of the life tenant to corporate dividends, as opposed to those of the re-
mainderman, have frequently vexed I the courts in recent years. Usually the
difficulties arise not from the question what principle to apply but from the com-
plexities of corporate acc.ounting.2  However, in the recent New York case of
In Re Jackson's Will ' the problem before the court was further complicated
by the unusual character of the corporate enterprise.
In This case the testator died in 1913 leaving corporate shares in trust for
his wife for life with remainder to collateral relatives. The corporation had
been organized in 19o6 to purchase a tract of unproductive 4 land for specu-
lation. Approximately four-fifths of the tract was sold in 1927 and immedi-
ately thereafter a IOO per cent. cash dividend was declared out of the profit
realized by the sale. The corporation had never improved the property nor had
it ever acquired any other property. It further appeared that the future activi-
ties of the corporation would be limited to the disposal of the balance of the
tract. The Surrogate r and the Appellate Division 6 held that the entire divi-
dend should go to the remainderman as being in effect a distribution of capital
assets. The Court of Appeals awarded 7 the dividend to the life tenant (Car-
dozo, C. J., Lehman and Kellogg, J. J., dissenting) on the theory that it rep-
resented corporate earnings.
In order to avoid accounting difficulties in the apportionment of dividends
a few courts have promulgated arbitrary principles 8 which, though supposedly
'See Ferguson, Stock Dividends (1929) I PA. BAR. Ass. Q. 14, 17.
'A method of avoiding these difficulties by algebra is outlined in Evans, Calculating
the Distribution of a Stock Dividend Between Life Tenant and Corpus (1929) 77 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 981.
a258 N. Y. 281, 179 N. E. 496 (1932).
4 This land had a book value of $187,ooo at the time of incorporation. The corporation
issued 1,87o shares at a par value of $ioo each to the original owners of the tract as pay-
ment for the land. Parts of the property were rented from time to time during the period
between i9o6 and 1928. From the profits, the corporation paid dividends (on par value)
varying from 13/ per cent. to 12 per cent. per annum, averaging about 5 per cent. These
dividends however were not taken into consideration by the Court of Appeals and are for
that reason ignored in the discussion of the case.
r 135 Misc. 329, z39 N. Y. Supp. 362 (1929), annotated in (193o) 29 MicH. L. Rav. 124.
'232 App. Div. 425, 250 N. Y. Supp. 324 (193).
'It is interesting to note that this litigation was not settled until four years after the
life tenant's death, which occurred in 1928. Part of the fund held by the trustees consisted
of money received from the sale of unproductive land. It was decreed without dissent that
this money should be apportioned between the life tenant and the remaindermen.
'The principal minority view known as the Massachusetts rule has been restated in
Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. IOI at io8 (1868) as follows: "A simple rule is to regard cash
dividends, however large, as income, and stock dividends, however made, as capital." This
rule has been followed in Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 (i&o) ; Bishop v. Bishop, 81
Conn. 509, 71 At. 583 (19o9); Billings v. Warren, 216 111. 281, 74 N. E. 1O5o (19o);
Thatcher v. Thatcher, 117 Me. 331, 1O4 At. 515 (1918): Humphrey v. Lang, 169 N. C.
6oi, 86 S. E. 526 (1915) ; Brown's Petition, 14 R. I. 371 (1884).
Under a rule announced by the Kentucky courts, the dividend, whether stock or cash,
goes to the person entitled to receive the income at the time the dividend is declared, without
regard to the time when it was earned provided the corpus is not thereby impaired. Cox v.
Gaulbert's Trustee, 148 Ky. 407, 147 S. W. 25 (1912) ; Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257, 2o S. W.
778 (1892). What constitutes corpus under the rule has not been adequately defined by
the cases.
In Georgia the subject is partially covered by statute. GA. ANt. CODE (Michie, 1926)
§ 3667.
(987)
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simple of application, seem unduly harsh in many instances.9 Most courts, how-
ever, follow the Pennsylvania rule which is generally accepted as theoretically
correct,"0 but difficult of application. The relative merits of these systems have
been frequently discussed in recent years and are not germane to the questions
involved in the principal case. The scope of this note is limited to cases under
the Pennsylvania rule the effect of which is to compel an examination of the
source of the dividend so as to give the life tenant the part which represents
earnings accumulated by the corporation during the life tenancy. The balance
is considered capital and belongs to corpus."
The Pennsylvania rule has been applied in the following types of dis-
tributions: (I) extraordinary cash dividends, 12 (2) extraordinary stock' divi-
dends,1 3 (3) stock rights,' 4 (4) dividends in voluntary liquidation,' (5) pro-
ceeds of stock sold by trustees.' 6 Though there is some authority for the prop-
osition that ordinary dividends should be apportioned,' 7 the vast majority of
the courts award them to the life tenant irrespective of their origin since the
convenience of such an exception 18 is alleged to outweigh the possibility of in-
justice in the distribution of the relatively small sums involved. However, be-
sides the probability of injustice 19 to the remainderman, due to the cases where
Under the Massachusetts rule awarding all stock dividends to the remainderman, the
life tenant would receive no income whatsoever if no cash dividends were declared.
"oCommentators have approved the Pennsylvania rule almost without exception; see
2 COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) § 552; MARAWETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2d ed.
1886) §§ 467, 468, 47r; PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs (7th ed. 1929) § 545a; -towEs,
INCOME AND PRINCIPAL (1905) 25; Note (1923) 23 COL. L. REV. 369.
'Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857) (leading case). This is generally known as the
American view and has been followed in most of the states; a complete list of cases may
be found by referring to Note (1927) 5o A. L. R. 375. The federal view is illustrated by
Long v. Rike, 50 F. (2d) 124 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931).
'Holbrook v. Holbrook, 74 N. H. 201, 66 Atl. 124 (19o7). Usually no distinction is
made between the methods of apportioning stock and cash dividends. Holbrook -v. Hol-
brook, supra; Matter of Osborne, 2o9 N. Y. 450, 1O3 N. E. 723 (913) ; 6 FLEczER, CoR-
PORATIONS (1919) § 3716.
'Matter of Osborne, supra note 12; Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449, 132 Atl. 352
(1926) ; Packer's Estate (No. I), 291 Pa. 194, 139 Atl. 867 (927).
"Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 22 Pa. 149, 14o Atl. 862 (1928). Variations in the
above types of distribution are discussed in Note (193o) 44 HARv. L. REv. IOI.
'5 Matter of Rogers, 161 N. Y. 1O8, 55 N. E. 393 (1899), aff'g 22 N. Y. App. 428, 48
N. Y. Sup. 175 (1897) ; Cobb v. Fant, 36 S. C. I, 14 S. E. 959 (1892). Contra: Bothwell v.
Estep, 6 P. (2d) iio8 (Wash. 1932).
sNirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 200 (1927) discussed in Note (1928) 76
U. OF PA. L. REv. 589 (1928) ; cf. Matter of Martin, 138 Misc. 216, 245 N. Y. Supp. 2O1
(193o) (proceeds of stock rights) ; see Note (1931) 16 CORN. L. Q. 616. The accumula-
tion of earnings as reflected in the price of the stock belong to the life tenant, since the
accumulations are derived from the capital. McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78, io6 Atl. 189
(1919). However, principal as increased by enhanced earning power, belongs to the re-
mainderman, together with all other enhanced market value not attributable to accumulated
earnings. Connoly's Estate, x98 Pa. 137, 47 Atl. 1125 (19O) ; Neel's Estate (No. 2), 207
Pa. 446, 56 Atl. 750 (1904).
1 "I cannot assent to the idea that some dividends should stand on a different footing
from others. To hold that when a life estate begins one day before a dividend is declared
the entire dividend shall go to the life tenant may be convenient, but certainly is unjust."
Lang v. Lang's Ex'r, 57 N. J. Eq. 325 at 328, 41 Atl. 705 at 7o6 (1898) ; cf. Ballantine v.
Young, 79 N. J. Eq. 7o. 81 Atl. 119 (1911).
's "In ordinary dividends on stock, periodically declared, the intervals between the times
of payment are so brief, and the sums so divided so small, that no great injustice can be done
in following the rule of convenience, while, on the other hand, the necessity for it is usually
very strong, arising from the difficulty of ascertaining the exact amount of profits made
during fractions of the period." Earp's Appeal, supra note II, at 375. See also Matter of
Osborne, supra note 12, 459, lO3 N. E. at 725.
'Providing its surplus is not impaired there is nothing to prevent the corporation from
declaring ordinary dividends out of surplus earned prior to the creation of the trust. There-
fore the courts under the Pennsylvania rule are confronted by a situation where it is pos-
sible, by declarations of current dividends over a period of years to dissipate the entire
NOTES
the current dividend includes capital surplus, the refusal of the courts to appor-
tion ordinary dividends requires that a distinction be made between ordinary
and extraordinary dividends,2" a distinction often difficult to establish when the
dividends are declared irregularly as in the principal case. In New York "- the
Pennsylvania rule is applied to all the above types of distributions except cor-
porate shares which are governed by a statute 22 providing that stock dividends
shall belong to corpus.
2 3
In practice the application of the rule varies. When the dividend, whether
cash or stock, represents earnings which have accrued both before and after
the creation of the trust, the courts employ the analogy of uncollected interest
on bonds in awarding only the amount earned during the existence of the trust
to the life tenant..2 4 When the dividends are paid out of profit realized from
the sale of capital assets, the entire amount goes to the remainderman. 5 The
same result is reached a fortiori if the dividend is declared out of the entire
proceeds of a sale of capital assets.2 Of course, extraordinary dividends which
in part represent earnings and in part represent capital are divided proportion-
ately between the two estates.2 7  In no case may the life tenant receive a share
of the dividend even though attributable to earnings if it is needed to keep
intact the book value 28 of the shares as it was at the time the trust began.
20
surplus without invoking the rule of apportionment to protect the remainderman. For an
elaboration of this phase, see Note (1929) 3 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 267, 274.
' Though the cases do not declare any well defined rule for distinguishing between
ordinary and extraordinary dividends, the following circumstances seem material: (i)
whether a regular dividend has also been declared that year, (2) whether the regular divi-
dend is larger or smaller, (3) whether the dividend was declared for an unusual purpose
(e. g., to enable stockholders to subscribe to a new issue of stock).
'Matter of Osborne, supra note 12 (leading case). An important case reiterating the
Pennsylvania rule is Pratt v. Ladd, 235 N. Y. 213, 17o N. E. 895 (193o) discussed in Note
(i93o) 18 CALF. L. REv. 535.
SN. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 193o) c. 42, § 17 (a).
The negative inference from this statute may have helped the court in the principal
case to arrive at its decision that cash dividends should belong to the life tenant.
11 Stokes Estate (No. I), 24o Pa. 277, 87 Ati. 971 (913).
'Miller v. Payne, I5o Wis. 354, 136 N. W. 81 (1912); see Ex Parte Humbird, 114
Md. 627, 634, 8o Atl. 2o9, 212 (igI). A dividend which represents a natural increment in
the value of the corporate business is to that extent capital, whether the increase took place
before or after the creation of the trust. Poole v. Union Trust Co., 191 Mich. 162, 157 N. W.
430 (igi6).
'Eisner's Estate, 175 Pa. 143, 34 Atl. 577; Estate of Wells, 156 Wis. 294, 144 N. W.
I4 (1914).
"Thayer v. Burr, 2oI N. Y. 155, 94 N. E. 6o4 (igii) ; cf. In re Warren's Estate, 33
N. Y. St. 584, 1I N. Y. Supp. 787 (i8go).
Though the courts often intimate-that the intrinsic value of the assets is the real value
that should be used as a basis of calculation, the book value is generally presumed to be the
intrinsic value of the absence of evidence to the contrary. The book value is determined by
adding to the par value of the outstanding capital stock, the balance credited to the surplus
account.
'Matter of Osborne, supra note 12, at 485, 1O3 N. E. at 823; Boyer's Appeal, 224 Pa.
144, 73 Atl. 320 (I909).
The rule that the book value of the stock must be preserved as of the time the trust was
created is subject to an exception where there have been subsequent capital gains or losses.
In that case the book value must be kept intact as of the time of the last capital transaction.
Packer's Estate, supra note 13. This principle is well illustrated in Dickinson's Estate,
supra note 13. Here the stock dividend represented earnings which would normally have
been awarded in toto to the life tenant since the book value of the stock at the time the trust
came into being was lower than it was after the declaration of the dividend. However, two
transactions occurring in the interim were held to necessitate a change in the application of
the rule. First, a fire caused a large decrease in the book value of the assets. Second, the
corporation sold blocks of new stock at a price considerably above par, which resulted in a
large increase in the book value of the assets. After the fire loss had been deducted from
.and the gain on the sale of stock had been added to the value of the original stock at the
time of the creation of the trust, it was found that the book value thus obtained was higher
than the book value determined as of the time the stock dividend was declared. It was
decreed that the life tenant should make good this difference.
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Unfortunately, as in other subjects involving the interpretation of wills, the
application of the Pennsylvania rule is often confused by an attempt to suit the
decision to the intention of the testator when the intention is not clearly ex-
pressed.30
From the principles enunciated above, it is obvious that the first issue to be
decided in any given situation is the source of the dividend. The primary ques-
tion in It Re Jackson's Will is, then, whether dividends of a corporation, organ-
ized merely for the purpose of selling a single tract of land, constitute income or
capital. The Court of Appeals treated the dividend as earnings on the theory
that the corporation had been in the business of disposing of the land at a profit.
The only case -, cited as authority, involving a corporation actively engaged in
buying, selling, and improving real estate, was admittedly 3 2 different in degree
from the principal case. The holding is correct only if the corporation's activi-
ties of preserving and negotiating the sale of realty may be considered a business.
The Appellate Division distinguished the case cited by the Court of Appeals
on the ground that the corporation here was a holding company organized for
the purpose of facilitating the conveyance of a title formerly held by numerous
co-tenants. Thus they arrived at the opposite conclusion that this corporation,
as a dormant concern, could have earned nothing at all. This result is in accord
with the little authority that exists on the precise facts of the principal case.3
From a practical standpoint the decision of the Appellate Division seems pref-
erable because of the corporation's striking resemblance to a trust, where clearly
the increment in the value of the realty would have been capital.
Using the analogy of land held directly in trust without the interposition of
the corporate entity, the Appellate Division arrived at the conclusion that the
dividend was the product of capital. However, the further conclusion that the
entire dividend should go to the remainderman seems erroneous in view of other
decisions involving unproductive 3 4 land held by a trustee.3  From the general
principle that the life tenant is entitled to the actual income of productive realty
the Supreme Court seems to have inferred that if the income is nothing the life
tenant should receive nothing.36 This view is fallacious because the productivity
of real estate does not ordinarily diminish the value of the remainder, whereas
its unproductivity does diminish the value of the life estate.? The better view
' See principal case, supra note 3. at 288, 179 N. E. at 499; cf. Creed v. Connelily, 272
Mass. 24i, 172 N. E. lo6 (930); Furniss v. Cruickshank, 23o N. Y. 495, 13o N. E. 625
(1921). These cases are merely instances of the extraordinarily frequent reversal of the
trial court's interpretation of the testator's intent.
'Matter of Enz's Will, 204 App. Div. 634, 198 N. Y. Supp. 8o2 (corporation engaged
in farming and leasing lands and disposing of extensive crops grown thereon).
"Principal case, supra note 3, at 288, 179 N. E. at 498.
' Ex Parte Humbird, supra note 25. Spedden v. Norton, 159 Md. IOI, 15o Atl. 2)
(930); Miller v. Payne, 15o Wis. 354. 136 N. W. 811 (1912).
"Unproductive realty for the purpose of the law of trusts means land which is an im-
proper trust investment because it does not yield the usual trust income, normally about 5 per
cent. For the benefit of the life tenant such property should be sold and the proceeds rein-
vested. However, when this cannot be done immediately, the life tenant should receive
enough of the proceeds, when the property is finally sold, to recompense him for all loss of
income to which he was reasonably entitled.
'In re Atkinson [1904] 2 Ch. i6o; Parker v. Seely, 56 N. J. Eq. 1I0, 38 AtI. 280
(1897) ; Park's Estate. 173 Pa. 190, 33 Atl. 884 (1896).
'The argument is used in Martin v. Kimball, 86 N. J. Eq. IO, 15, 96 Atl. 565, 567
(3916). The unimproved realty was held for a time by the trustees and then sold as building
lots. The court refused to apportion the proceeds on the ground that, "If testatrix intended
her husband to enjoy the rents, that negatives the idea that she intends him to enjoy notional
income. [By notional income is meant a share in the proceeds of sale.] If she gave him
rents, she cannot be deemed to contemplate a condition of the property in which there will
be no rents."
'This reasoning is more fully explained in Note (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 275, 28o.
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seems to be that in the absence of actual income from the land the life tenant
should be awarded an equitable income, i. e., a share in the proceeds of sale.38
In practice this equitable income on both realty and personalty 39 is calcu-
lated by many courts as follows: to principal that sum which, invested at a
conservative rate 40 of simple interest,41 would have produced the net sale price; 42
to income the remaining p6rtion of the proceeds of sale.43  The period of delay
is usually defined as beginning either at the time of the testator's death 4" or one
year thereafter.4 5 Other courts compute the income by calculating the value of
authorized securities which could have been obtained by immediate conversion,
giving the life tenant the income which these securities would have earned until
the actual conversion.4" Unfortunately, the courts have not yet sanctioned the
doctrine of equitable income in all cases involving unproductive property; nu-
merous dicta assert that evidence 47 that the testator intended a conversion must
be found before the life tenant may receive any part of the proceeds.4s How-
ever, the courts require little or no basis to find such an intent.4 9 The secondary
authorities are unanimous in maintaining that an apportionment should be made
whether the will authorizes, directs, or makes no mention of a sale.50
Since the corporation under discussion was organized to hold capital assets
for capital gains, it is difficult to discover a logical basis for the Court of Ap-
peal's refusal to award the dividend to the remainderman. However, even
though the correctness of the Court of Appeal's view that the dividend repre-
sented earnings is conceded, the decree awarding the life tenant the entire sum
is still open to question. The court failed to pass on the point whether the
dividend under discussion was an extraordinary one. If the court refused to
apportion the sum on the theory that it was an ordinary dividend, the decision
is incorrect since the principle of judicial convenience applies only to current
dividends involving small amounts!" If on the other hand the court assumed
I Edwards v. Edwards, 183 Mass. 58I, 67 N. E. 658 (I9O3) ; Furniss v. Cruickshank,
supra note 3o; cf. Lawrence v. Littlefield, 215 N. Y. 56I, IO9 N. E. 6II (1915) ; Matter of
Hopkins, 133 Misc. 55.1, 233 N. Y. Supp. 326 (1929) (where the life tenant seems to have
been given the actual income of productive reality and a share in the proceeds of unpro-
ductive realty).
' See Gates v. Gates, 28 Beav. 637, 639 (N. Y. i86o) ; Jordan v. Jordan, 392 Mass. 337,
345, 78 N. E. 459, 46, (19o6).
Many commentators suggest a rate of 4 or 5 per cent. In practice a master is usually
appointed to fix a reasonable rate, taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case.
' Lawrence v. Littlefield, supra note 37.
'-Edwards v. Edwards, 183 Mass. 58I, 67 N. E. 658 (19o3).
' If the tenant has received any income from the property his share of the proceeds is
reduced by that amount, see UNIFORM PRINCIPAL, AND INCOME ACT (Prog. Natl. Conf. of
Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws 193o) § I2. This Act is analyzed in Note (1932) _32
CoL L. REv. 118.
"Ogden v. Allen, 225 Mass. 595, 114 N. E. 86z (1917) ; Matter of Pinkney, 203 App.
Div. 181, 2o2, N. Y. Supp. 818 (924), aff'd, 238 N. Y. 6o2, 144 N. E. 909 (1924). If the
rule of these cases were followed strictly, there would have to be an apportionment every
time unproductive realty was left in trust, even though the property were sold a week after
the testator's death.
Furniss v. Cruickshank, supra note 30.
"Howe v. Dartmouth, 7 Ves. 338 (Eng. I8o2).
7 It is almost impossible to determine what circumstances will constitute a conversion.
The language of the will and the amount of solicitude manifested for the life tenant are
often controlling.
,"See Martin v. Kimball, 86 N. J. Eq. io, 16, 96 Atl. 565, 567 (1916); Matter of
Schuster, 323 Misc. 316, 317, 205 N. Y. Supp. 268, 27o (1924).
"Edwards v. Edwards, supra note 43; Furniss v. Cruickshank, supra note 30 (in both
cases there was a mere discretionary power of sale; in the latter case the life tenant was
given the net income only).
r UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACr (1930) § 12; see PRoPER'rY RESTATEMENT
(Am. L. Inst. 1931) § 165;' Brandis, Trust Administration: Apportionment of Proceeds of
Sale of Unproductive Land and of Expenses (3931) N. C. L. REv. 127, 129.
O" See Earp's Appeal, supra note 11, at 374.
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that the dividend was extraordinary, the refusal to apportion can only be justi-
fied on the ground that the entire profit from the sale was earned since the cre-
ation of the trust.52 Although the corporation purchased the land seven years
before the settlor's death, the court awarded the life tenant the profit from the
increase in value during that period in addition to the increment after the crea-
tion of the trust. This decree can be explained only in the light of the present
bookkeeping practice which forbids the entry of any profit until realized by sale.
Proper accounting requires that a profit on land held for speculation over a
twenty-year period be considered as earned only at the moment of sale. Though
such a practice may be sanctioned in the case of swiftly fluctuating securities, it
seems unnecessarily arbitrary where land subject to a legitimate and permanent
rise in value is involved. Furthermore, this practice has the unfortunate result of
making the life tenant's interest entirely dependent on whether he lives until the
property is sold. If the life tenant survived the testator by one day, and the
land were sold on that day, the representatives of the former would take the
entire amount. Similarly in the case of successive estates if the first life tenant
lived twenty years and the second life tenant survived the first by one day, the
entire dividend would be awarded to the representatives of the second tenant.53
A more equitable result would have been achieved by ordering an inquiry 54
into the value of the land at the time of the commencement of the trust and
awarding the life tenant her share of the increase since that time 5 5 only. The
principle that the moment of realization is alone pertinent in allocating profits
apparently originated in the field of unrealized capital appreciations where the
courts fear improper declarations of dividends.56 Obviously, this danger is
not present when the purpose of recognizing a paper profit is to determine the
relative rights of life tenant and remainderman.
The opinions rendered in the principal case well illustrate the inroads which
have been made on the original Pennsylvania view that the equitable rights of
the life tenant and the remainderman should be the sole criterion in apportion-
ing dividends. The first is the refusal to apportion ordinary dividends. The
second is the accounting rule which fixes a profit at the moment of realization.
Both of these exceptions may result in injustice to the remainderman. The
third is the refusal to modify the remainderman's right to receive the principal,
in the absence of express authorization by the testator, to suit the case of un-
productive property. This exception tends to injure the life tenant. Each ex-
ception seems to have been born of the courts' desire to simplify the accounting
for the benefit of the trustees. However, these attempts to make the rule easier
'But see note 23.
'Note, however, that where the land was held directly in trust the New York court
avoided this absurd result. In Matter of Pinkney, supra note 43, the court held that the
part of the sale price allotted to income should be divided between the second tenant and the
estate of the first on the ratio of their respective tenures to the entire period of delay.
"' The court probably failed to order such an inquiry because it would have required
more accounting and an appraisal of land as of a time fifteen years earlier. However, this
difficulty will be inherent in all the apportionment cases until the courts become familiar with
the various formulae suggested by commentators to simplify these calculations. See for
example Evans, op. cit. supra note 2.
Spedden v. Norton, supra note 33.
'This strict accounting principle seems certain to be modified because of its logical
difficulties. For example, assume that the corporation has an authorized and issued capital
of 2o shares of the par value of $io each, and invested the total in $20o worth of realty.
Due to a permanent rise in land values the land is later worth $3oo. The corporation cannot
declare a dividend from such increase without selling the land. Yet if the corporation sold
the land and immediately purchased a $3oo plot in another part of the city, the court would
undoubtedly sanction the distribution of a $ioo dividend. An English case has gone so far
as to permit the payment of a dividend out of good-will built up over a period of some years.
Stapely v. Read Bros. Ltd. [1924] 2 Ch. i. For an elaboration of this topic, read Hills,
Dividends from Unrealized Capital Appreciation (1928) 6 N. Y. L. REv. 155.
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of application, together with the principle, that the testator's intention must be
fulfilled in all cases, have injected so much uncertainty into the rule itself that
it is now impossible to determine logically what the result should be in any
new factual situation.
W.W.B.
LIMITATIONS ON ACTIONS UNDER DEATH STATUTES-At common law the
right of action in tort was abated by the death of the person injured thereby.1
So too, no tort right of action has for centuries been recognized as maintainable
by the family or dependents of one whose death resulted from an intentional
or negligent tort.2
The increasing number of deaths occurring in modern industry emphasized
the great injustice to the family of a deceased person which had no action for the
deprivation of its source of support.' England was the first to recognize the
unjust status of the existing law, and in order to alleviate the inequity of the
situation, its Parliament enacted the Lord Campbell's Act,4 more commonly
known as the Death by Wrongful Act Statute. This has been the prototype of
many similar statutes legislated in the United States.' Though the terminology
may vary from that of the original statute,6 the substance of these state enact-
ments is to bestow a right of recovery upon the families of those killed by
wrongful act.
It is essential that the Death by Wrongful Act Statute be distinguished from
the survival statutes, as much confusion will otherwise result from a study of the
cases. The right of the aggrieved party to recover for injuries caused by a tort
does not necessarily abate upon his death, but may be preserved by means of a
survival statute.7  This right descends to the personal representative who receives
the identical right of the deceased, which is only that which the injured party
would have possessed had he survived. Any defense which would have been
'TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL Acr (2d ed. 1913) § I.
'The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. I99, 7 Sup. Ct. 140 (1886) ; Baker v. Bolton, I Camp. 493
(Eng. i8o8) in which Lord Ellenborough stated for the first time the well-known proposi-
tion: "In a civil court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury."
But where there was a right of action entirely independent of the act causing death,
pecuniary damages could be recovered for a death that naturally followed the injury. Jackson
v. Watson & Son [1909] 2 K. B. 193 (where defendant sold the plaintiff tinned salmon, and
the plaintiff's wife died as a result of poisoning from the salmon, it was held that the
plaintiff could recover for the loss of his wife's services in an action for breach of warranty).
See Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort (1929) 29 CoL L. REv. 239.
"There was a glaring absurdity in allowing a husband and father, if injured, but not
killed, a right of action for the recovery of the damages thus sustained, and denying to his
widow and children any compensation for the damages inflicted upon them, should the
injury be greater and result in his death." Maney v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 49 Ill. App.
IO5 at 112 (I892). See Note (930) 8 CAN. B. REv. 685.
'9 & io Vicr., c. 93 (1846): "Whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by
wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death
had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages
in respect thereof, then, . . . the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued
shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured . . .
II "Every such action shall be for the benefit . . . (of certain named persons)
and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator of the person
deceased . . .
III "Provided . . . that not more than one action shall lie for and in respect of the
same subject matter of complaint; . . ."
G TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note I, § 24. Also see Analytical Table of the state statutes,
ibid. at xx.
'Ibid.
"A typical survival statute is that of Iowa. IOWA CODE (1927) § 10957: "All causes
of action shall survive and may be brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled
to or liable to the same."
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available to the tortfeasor in an action by the injured person may be invoked
in an action pursued by the personal representative, since his right is purely
substitutionary. Accordingly, the damages recoverable by the decedent's repre-
sentative are limited to the judgment that the injured party could have obtained
in an action brought before his death.' This amounts to the sum which would
have compensated the aggrieved person for loss of time, medical and other
expenses, and physical pain suffered as natural consequences of the wrongful
act.9 Any recovery which may be had by the representative becomes a portion
of the decedent's estate and is subject to his debts.10
The Death by Wrongful Act Statute differs from a survival statute in that
it creates a right which did not previously exist, and does not preserve an already
existent one. A new right is conferred upon the designated beneficiaries.,-
This interest is distinct from the common law interest in bodily security of the
decedent.12 To be sure, the wrongful act is the common foundation for both
actions, but two interests have been invaded-one, the interest in bodily security
of the deceased; the other, the statutory interest in the life of the decedent.
Mr. Justice Marshall asserted in Emerson v. Nash:"13
"A cause of action consists of those facts as to two or more persons
entitling at least some one of them to a judicial remedy of some sort against
the other, or others, for the redress or prevention of a wrong. It is essential
to the existence of such facts that there should be a right to be violated
and a violation thereof."
It is evident that two interests have been violated by the saine wrong, but as
these interests differ in nature, and are predicated of different persons, two causes
of action have accrued,' one being for the injured party and the other accruing
to the beneficiaries of that person. This statutory cause of the beneficiaries is an
inchoate one, contingent upon actionable negligence on the part of the defendant,
and upon the death of the aggrieved party. It depends upon the existence of a
'Muldowney v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 36 Iowa 462 (1873) ; Stewart v. United Electric L.
& P. Co., 1O4 Md. 332, 65 Atl. 49 (19o6); Clark v. Manchester, 62 N. H. 577 (1883);
2 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES (gth ed. 1912) § 57ob.
Scott Township v. Montgomery, 95 Pa. 444 (188o) ; 2 SFDGWlic, op. cit. supra note 8,
§ 481; 4 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4th ed. 1916) § 1241.
"Blackwell v. American Film Co., 189 Cal. 689, 2o9 Pac. 999 (1922); Muldowney v.
Illinois Central Ry.; Stewart v. United Electric L. & P. Co., both supra note 8. See Note
(19o2) 15 H-xv. L. REv. 854.
Homiewicz v. Orlowski, 143 At. 250 (Del. 1928) ; Ames v. Adams, 128 Me. 174, 146
Atl. 257 (1929).
' See supra note 4 for the provisions of the Death by Wrongful Act Statute. The
courts practically with unanimity have decided that a new right of action is created by the
statute. Mahoning Valley Ry. v. Van Alstine, 77 Ohio St. 395, 83 N. E. 6ol (19o8);
Rowe v. Richards, 35 S. D. 201, 151 N. W. IOOI (1915); Blake v. Midlands Ry., 18 Q. B.
93 (1852); Schumacher, Rights of Action Under Death and Survival Statutes (924) 23
MIcH. L. REv. 114; Note (1916) 64 U. OF PA. L. REV. 626; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note I,
§ 23. Contra: Mooney v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 414, 88 N. E. 194 (io9).
V, 124 Wis. 369 at 387, lo2 N. W. 921 at 928 (19o5). I BouVIER 436 (Rawle's 3d Revi-
sion, 1914) defines cause of action as: "Matter for which an action may be brought."
" . . the courts almost universally hold that the statutes which give, on behalf of
the next of kin, an action for an injury occasioned by the death of one killed, create a new
cause of action separate and distinct from, and not a continuation of, the common-law cause
of action given a party for his own physical injury." Rowe v. Richards, supra note 12, at
208, 151 N. W. at OO3. The distinction between the cause of the action or the wrongful act,
and cause of action, must be recognized. The cause of the action is an element of thd cause
of action.
The American courts have not given any definition to "cause of action". PoMERoY,
REMlEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS (3d ed. 1894) §§452-454. The courts use the terms
right of action and cause of action interchangeably. Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Brooks, 151
Ga. 625, 1O7 S. E. 878 (i92i). Thus there is no practical distinction in these terms.
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cause or right of action in the deceased before his death only to the extent that
there was a wrongful act as towards him. In all other respects the right of action
of the beneficiaries is a separate and distinct cause, ripening into actual being
at the moment of death of the injured party.15 This view has been well expressed
in Ames v. Adams in construing the Maine statute which is similar to the Death
by Wrongful Act Statute:
"The effect of the Lord Campbell Act was not to create a new remedy
for an existing cause of action but to create a cause of action itself where
none existed before. It was therefore necessarily a new cause of action,
a new right of action. The two causes are inherently distinct, both in their
nature and in their results." 18
The damages recoverable for the invasion of the statutory interest differ
in nature from those that may be obtained for the injury to the deceased. Whereas
the injured party may recover judgment for his loss of time, medical and other
expenses, and for physical pain, the beneficiaries may recover only the actual
pecuniary loss suffered by them from the deprivation of their source of sup-
port." Their damages commence at the point at which those for the injured
party cease. They do not include any portion of the recovery permitted the
injured party or his personal representative, but are estimated from the actual
financial loss to the persons designated by the statute. They constitute no part of
the decedent's assets, but form a separate fund, distinct from that of the estate,
and are not subject to the claims of the creditors of the deceased.,"
From a consideration of these factors, it seems indisputable that two separate
rights of action arise through the wrongful act causing the death. The parties
interested in recovery are different in the two actions; the damages are not the
same, nor do they go into the same fund. It would appear that the defenses
available in an action for the invasion of the one interest would not necessarily
apply in a suit to recover for the invasion of the other. Yet the confusion in the
cases has been great. The diversity of legal opinion is well exemplified by two
recent decisions in regard to the running of the Statute of Limitations 9
A Pennsylvania case, Howard v. The Bell Telephone Ca.,2 0 has decided
that where the Statute of Limitations has run against the injured party before
his death, his widow cannot maintain a suit against the alleged wrongdoer based
upon the same act of negligence. Although the statute upon which this decision
was rendered is easily distinguishable from the Lord Campbell's Act, the court
odmitted that the distinguishing features of that act were embodied in the
Pennsylvania statute, which reads: "Whenever death shall be occasioned by
unlawful violence or negligence, and no suit for damages be brought by the party
' Michigan Cent. R. R. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 33 Sup. Ct. 192 (1913); Stewart v.
United Electric L. & P. Co., supra note 8; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note I, § 23.
'0 Supra note ii, at 176, 146 Atl. at :257.
"7Waechter v. Second Ave. Traction Co., x98 Pa. 129, 47 Atl. 967 (9oi) ; English v.
Miller, 43 S. W. (2d) 642 (Tex. 1931); Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 3 P. (2d) 105
(Wyo. 1931); Jones, Civil Liability for Wrongful Death (1925) II IowA L. BUL. 28;
Note (1932) 16 MINN. L. REv. 409; 2 SEDGWICK, op. cit. supra note 8, §§ 572, 573; 5
SUTHERLAND, op. cit. sipra note 9, § 1259; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note I, § 153. However,
the statutes vary, and the suit may be brought for the benefit of the estate, or the jury
may assess damages that are fair and just, or the award may be in proportion to the wrong.
2 SFGWcNic, mspra, § 57Ib.
'Michigan Cent. R. R. v. Vreeland, supra note 15; Legis. (931) 44 HAv. L. REV.
98; Schumacher, op. cit. supra note 12; Note (igi6) 64 U. OF PA. L. REv. 626; TRusTs
RESTATEmENT (Am. L. Inst. 1930) § 9(h).
Dameron v. Southern Ry., 161 S. E. 641 (Ga. 1931) ; Howard v. The Bell Telephone
Co. of Pa., Pa. Sup. Ct., decided Mar. 14, 1932, aff'g 15 D. & C. 411 (Pa. 193I), commented
upon in (1931) 8o U. OF PA. L. REv. 305.
. Supra note 19.
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injured during his or her life, the widow, of such deceased, .. . mayTnaintain an
action for and recover-.damages for the death thus occasioned." 21
The widow in this case brought her action within the period permitted by
the statute 2 2 but the court held that the right created in the widow by the statute
was merely in substitution for the right of her deceased husband and that,
therefore, since her deceased husband's action was barred at his death she could
not recover. In holding that her right was derivative, the court asserted:
"It must be remembered that the cause of action contemplated by the
statute is the tort, the 'unlawful violence or negligence', and not the death
caused by the tort." 23
From a reading of the statute it seems clear that this statement is inaccurate,
for the statute specifically provides that "the widow . . . may maintain an
action for and recover damages for the death 24 thus occasioned". The widow
sought relief for the injury inflicted upon her, which was the death, and not
recovery for her husband's injury.
The court in the instant case quoted with approval from another Pennsyl-
vania case to the effect:
"We are not aware of any case, certainly our attention has not been
called to any, in which a widow has recovered for injuries to her husband
where he could not have done so himself if he had survived. And on prin-
ciple it is perfectly clear that she can never do so, for the original right of
action is in him and hers is but in succession or substitution for his where
he has not asserted it himself.
25
On analysis, that case discloses that the issue involved was whether the deceased
was contributorily negligent, and it was held that he was. Therefore, it would
seem that the only meaning of the above quotation is that when there is no
actionable negligence on the part of the defendant, neither the injured party nor
his widow may maintain an action. This, of course, represents the general
view, but it has no application to the problem presented by the Howard case.
Apparently, the court overlooked the comparatively recent decision of Regan
v. White, where the widow in pursuing her death action attempted to recover
damages for medical expenses for services rendered her husband. Recovery
for that item was denied, former Chief Justice von Moschzisker stating:
"The Act of 1851 created a new and distinct right of action in the
widow, to recover for the death of her husband, occasioned by negligence;
it was not a right to succeed to causes of action theretofore existing in the
deceased. Since the purpose of the act is to permit recovery "for the
death", only items of damage attributable to that cause can be sued
for . . ..
The Federal courts which have construed the Pennsylvania statute have held
that the widow's cause of action is not a substitutionary right.27 In Western
Act of April 15, 1851, P. L. 669, § i9, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 15977.
'Act of April 26, 1855, P. L. 309, §2, PA. STAT. (West, J92o) §,5979: ". • . the
action shall be brought within one year after the death, and not thereafter."
SSnpra note 29, citing Centofanti v. Penna. R. R., 244 Pa. 255, 90 Atl. 558 (914).
-Italics the writer's.
'Supra note i9, citing Hughes v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 76 Pa. 254, 35 Atl.
i9o (1896).
M29o Pa. 167, at 172, 138 Ati. 751, at 753 (1927). However since that case medical
and funeral expenses may be recovered under the Act of May 13, 1927, P.,L. 992, PA. STAT.
(Supp. I928) § 15981 (a).
-'Roman v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 241 Fed. 595 (E. D. N. Y. 1917).
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Union Telegraph Co. v. Preston,28 which- is not mentioned in the decision in the
Howard case, the Circuit Court of Appeals had the same question before it. It
decided contrary to the Pennsylvania case and held that the fact that at the date
of her husband's death the statute had run against his action was not a bar to the
widow's right to recover. Since the plaintiff in the Howard case complied with
the provisions of the Statute of Limitations 29 in suing for the death of her hus-
band within a year of the death, a contrary holding in the instant case would have
more fully achieved the legislative purpose and thereby would have prevented
a seeming hardship. This, certainly, was the purpose of the Lord Campbell Act,
the distinguishing features of which the court admitted to be embodied in the
Pennsylvania statute.
Another recent case, Dameron v. Southern Railway,0 presents the same
issue in respect to a statute also patterned after the Lord Campbell Act. The
facts were similar to those of Howard v. The Bell Telephone Co., that is, the
period of limitations had passed as to the injured party before his death, and the
suit was by the widow for the damages occasioned by the death of her husband,
brought within the period allotted her by the statute. The court held that her
action was not defeated by the running of the period of limitations as to the
deceased, for her cause or right of action did not ripen into actual existence until
the death of her husband. This is the logical conclusion and many courts adhere
to this view in holding that the Death Statute limitation period is distinct from
that for the action permitted the aggrieved party.31 The right accrues at the
moment of the death of the injured party, and the period of limitations cannot
commence running until that moment. The reasons for this view will be found
in the following discussion.
There are numerous cases to the contrary and in accord with Howard v.
The Bell Telephone Co. in holding that the tolling of the period of limitations
as to the action available to the injured person before his death is a bar to the
action instituted by the designated person for the beneficiaries under the Death
Statute." In view of the fundamental consideration that two distinct and
separate rights are involved it is anomalous to regard the husband's failure to
0 254 Fed. 229 (C. C. A. 3d, I918), aff'g 25o Fed. 48o (E. D. Pa. I918), certiorars de-
nied, 248 U. S. 585, 39 Sup. Ct. 182 (Ig91).
' Supra note 22.
'Supra note 19.
'Western & Atlantic R. R. v. Bass, lO4 Ga. 390, 30 S. E. 874 (1898); Dameron v.
Southern Ry., supra note ig; Donnelly v. Chicago City R. R., 163 Ill. App. 7 (I9I);
Causey v. Seaboard Air-Line R. R., 166 N. C. 5, 81 S. E. 917 (1914) ; Hoover v. Chesapeake
& Ohio R. R., 46 W. Va. 268, 33 S. E. 224 (1899). Also see Note (1931) 72 A. L. R. 1313.
See Dodson v. Continental Can Co., 159 Wash. 589, 294 Pac. 265 (193o) in which the
problem involved was whether or not the statute of limitations commenced on the day of
the death or on the date of the appointment of the administrator. It was held that the
period began to run on the date of the death. To the same effect, see Phila. & Reading Ry.
v. Koons, 281 Pa. 270, 126 At. 381 (1924).
' Flynn v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 283 U. S. 53, 5, Sup. Ct. 357 (1931), cited by
the court in Howard v. The Bell Telephone Co., supra note i, with approval (how-
ever that case was decided under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 35 STAT. 65, c. 149,
§ i (1908), 45 U. S. C. A. §5I (1928), and amending Act, 36 STAT. 291, c. 143, §2 (I910),
45 U. S. C. A. § 59 (1928). This statute differs from the Pennsylvania statute in that both
a right of action is granted to the dependents for their loss and also a survival of the
decedent's right of action is given to the family of the injured party. It is illogical to hold
that the passing of the period of limitations as to the deceased should prevent recovery under
the right of action for the loss to the dependents, especially when two separate actions were
created). Williams v. Alabama Great So. Ry., 158 Ala. 396, 48 So. 485 (9o8) (the court
construed the statute as being a survival statute) ; Kelliher v. New York Central & H. R. R.,
212 N. Y. 2o7, 1O5 N. E. 824 (914), aff'g 153 App. Div. 617, 139 N. Y. Supp. 894 (I912) ;
Casey v. Auburn Tel. Co., 155 App. Div. 66, 139 N. Y. Supp. 579 (1913) ; Howard v. The
Bell Telephone Co., supra note i; Williams v. Mersey Docks & Harbor Board [19o5]
i K. B. 8o4. Also see Note (ig3i) 72 A. L. R. 1316, for a collection of cases.
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bring an action within the statutory period as a bar to the widow's right to
1 ecover under a death statute. There is no such relation between the rights of
the deceased and beneficiaries that a bar to the decedent's action should be held to
be a bar to the action brought under the Death Statute. The rights of action
are not the same, though the wrongful act causing the injury to the deceased
was the common foundation for both actions. To hold that the passing of the
period as to the deceased is a bar to the beneficiaries would be to constitute the
deceased an agent for the beneciaries, so that the laches of the injured party
would be the laches of the beneficiaries. It is evident that this relationship is not
an existing one.
One theory advanced by the proponents of the argument that the running
of the Statute of Limitations as against the injured party is a bar to an action
under the Death Statute is based upon the wording of that statute: ". . . the
act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled
the party injured to maintain an action for and recover damages in respect
thereof, then . . . the person who would have been liable if death had not
ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of
the person injured . . ." , The contention is made that the tortfeasor would
not have been liable at the time of death to the injured party, as the period of
limitations had run against the decedent, and consequently should not be liable to
the beneficiaries 4 But those suggesting this interpretation have misconstrued
the statute. The meaning of the above terminology is that there would be no
action unless there was actionable negligence on the part of the defendant and
no contributory negligence on the part of the deceased.35 It suffices that the
deceased could have maintained a suit at one time.38 It is not necessary that he
could bring his suit at the time of his death, but all that is requisite is that at one
time the injured party had a cause or right of action.
It may be significant to note that the courts in the cases deciding that the
above words in the English statute (Lord Campbell's Act), and American stat-
utes containing identical provisions, preclude recovery after the period of limita-
tions has passed as to the injured party, often intimate that they would have
permitted a recovery had the statute in question not expressly so provided. Even
if there were any merit in this argument it lends no support to the decision in
the Pennsylvania case since the Pennsylvania statute does not include this pro-
vision.
Another reason for the view that the running of the period of limitations
as against the injured party is a bar to the death action is the policy underlying
all statutes of limitations-namely, the practical desire to avoid subjecting the
tortfeasor to the possibility of a suit at some distant date.3 7 This argument
raises a substantial objection to permitting recovery, for the witnesses of the tort-
feasor may have removed from the jurisdiction or they may have died, and thus
the wrongdoer would have no proof of his defense. It is possible that objection
'• Supra note 4.
'Edwards v. Interstate Chemical Co., 17o N. C. 551, 87 S. E. 635 (1915); Read v.
Great Eastern Ry., L. R. 3 Q. B. 555 (1868).
'O'Brien v. Standard Oil Co., 38 F. (2d) 8o8 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930) (widow could not
recover as the deceased was contributorily negligent); Memphis & Charleston R. R. v.
Copeland, 61 Ala. 376 (1878); Bachman v. Independence Indemnity Co., 297 Pac. 119
(Cal. 1931) ; see Note (io6) 19 HARV L. REV. 458; Schumacher, op. cit. supra note 12.
Sherlock v. Alling, 44 Ind. 184 (1873), at 197: "Yet by the terms of the act, no action
can be maintained under it, unless the act or omission causing the death was such that the
deceased might, if alive, maintain an action for an injury caused by the same act or omission.
That provision is inserted, for the purpose of defining the degree of delinquency with which
the party must be chargeable, in order to subject him to the action."
, Causey v. Seaboard Air-Line Ry., supra note 31.
'This possible objection has been suggested in (93) 8o U. or PA. L. REv. 305.
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influenced the court in Howard v. The Bell Telephone Co., as the death of -the
injured party occurred twenty-one years after the accident. But the same loss
of witnesses may have happened to the plaintiffs. Could not the defendant have
depositions taken at the time of the wrong? These could later be introduced into
evidence in order to determine the existence of negligence. Furthermore, the
beneficiaries must meet the requirement of satisfying the jury that the defendant
was negligent and that death resulted from this negligence. The risk of per-
suasion is with them, and the risk becomes greater as the date of the death is
further removed from the date of the wrongful act.
Since the beneficiaries' right of action does not accrue until the death of the
aggrieved party, it is illogical to contend that the action under the Death Statute
should be barred before it has arisen, merely because the action for the injured
party is barred. The courts have decided that the Death Statute creates an
independent right of action for the beneficiaries, and therefore it is untenable
to assert that that action could not be pursued within the period permitted under
the Death Statute. The courts that hold that the action may not be brought are
really contradicting their previous decisions to the effect that a new and distinct
right is created by unknowingly construing the Death Statute as a survival statute.
Another limitation to a recovery under the Death Statute is the view of the
majority of courts that a recovery or release by the deceased for the damages
sustained by him from a wrongful act is a bar to an action under the Death
Statute.38  It is submitted further that this opinion is unsound. A reason
advanced for this majority holding is that the words of the act prohibit a
recovery after a. recovery by the injured party.3 9 But as Las been suggested
above, the words "the act, neglect . . . is such as would (if death had not
ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action" mean that action-
able negligence must exist on the part of the defendant.40 Unless the defendant
were guilty of negligence,4 ' and the deceased free of contributory negligence, 42
the administrator would have no action to pursue in favor of the benefit of the
beneficiaries. As has been previously stated, the beneficiaries' right of action
is contingent to the extent that it is dependent on the existence of actionable
negligence, for otherwise there would be no wrongful act.
Another theory advanced is that a recovery by the injured decedent pre-
vents his dependents from bringing an action because of the provision which
occurs in the English act and many American acts (but not that of Pennsylvania)
to the effect that "not more than one action shall lie for and in respect to the
same subject matter of complaint".' Under this theory, it is thought that the
accord and satisfaction discharges the claims arising from the wrongful act.44
This might be correct were it not true that two causes of action arose from the
original act of negligence. Only one action was pursued before death-that of
'Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U. S. 335, 48 Sup. Ct. 541 (1928) ; Perry v. P., B. & W.
R. R., 24 Del. 399, 77 Atl. 725 (igio) (statute similar to that of Pennsylvania, supra note
21) ; Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. Cassin, III Ga. 575, 36 S. E. 881 (igoo) ; Mooney v. City
of Chicago, mipra note 12; Hecht v. Ohio & M. Ry., 132 Ind. 507, 32 N. E. 302 (1892) ;
Melitch v. United Rys. and Electric Co., 121 Md. 457, 88 Atl. 229 (1913); Littlewood v.
Mayor, 8q N. Y. 24 (1882); Edwards v. Interstate Chemical Co., supra note 34; Hill v.
Pennsylvania R. R., 178 Pa. 223, 35 Atl. 997 (1896) ; Read v. The Great Eastern Ry., supra
note 34; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note I, § 124.
'Northern Pac. Ry. v. Adams, 192 U. S. 440, 24 Sup. Ct. 408 (3904).
'oSupra note 5." Jackson v. Standard Oil Co., 98 Ga. 749, 26 S. E. 6o (i896).
'Weatherly v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry., 166 Ala. 575, 51 So. 959
(igog); Gay v. Winter, 34 Cal. 153 (1867) ; Abend v. Terre Haute & Indianapolis R. R.,
III Ill. 202 (884); TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note I, §§ 65, 66.
'Supra note 4, III.
' Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. Cassin, supra note 38; Melitch v. United Rys. & Electric
Co., supra note 38.
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the injured party. Since he is not acting as agent of his wife, so that a recovery
for him should not preclude a recovery for her as a widow, and since he has not
recovered the damages for his own death, which is an injury to the wife, it is
difficult to see how a recovery which was in satisfaction of the injured party's
cause of action is "in respect of the same subject matter of complaint" which
forms the basis of her suit.
The fear of double recovery or of excessive verdicts may enter the minds
of the courts in deciding that there can be no action under a Death Statute after
a release or a recovery by the decedent before his death.45  It is unreasonable to
assert that there is a double recovery for the death in this situation, as there
1-ad been no death at the time of recovery by the injured party. The jury will
not estimate the value of the person's life and award it to him merely because he
has been injured by a wrongful act. The case may aiise in which the injured
person dies before judgment is rendered in his favor, or as is more probable,
before a suit is instituted. The question would then be presented: "Would
not a double recovery be had ?" An answer may be found in the statement of
McSherry, J.:
"The trial judge can easily, by proper instructions, limit the recovery
in a survival action to the loss actually caused to the deceased prior to his
death, [and in an action under a Death Statute] to the pecuniary loss sus-
tained by the surviving relatives entitled to the benefits of the provision." 46
Any fear that a person would be subject to a double recovery for the death
caused by his wrongful act may be dispelled by the previous explanation of the
difference in the damages under the two actions. Yet the same courts permit
the personal representative to sue in his dual capacity concurrently and recover
damages for both interests.4 It is inconceivable that they can reach this con-
clusion with any consistency with their other holdings.
The courts ruling strictly as to the amount of damages recoverable for each
action do not hold that a recovery for the action of the injured party bars the
other.48 This is the better view, for it is difficult to comprehend how the injured
party may release a right which was not his and which was not in actual existence
at the time the release was given by him, or at the time he recovered damages
for the invasion of his interest. This right of action arises at the moment of death
and is for the beneficiaries and not for the decedent's estate. The result achieved
by this latter view is more just, as all parties in interest are protected. The credi-
tors of the deceased may have satisfaction of their claims from the recovery
permitted for the estate. But the amount recovered under the Death Statute is
a fund for the specified beneficiaries, and will enable them to be protected against
any loss of support suffered by them because of the death of one who supported
them. Thus the primary purpose of the Lord Campbell's Act will be carried out,
namely, the prevention of hardships to the families or dependents of the one
killed by a wrongful act.
"Littlewood v. Mayor, supra note 38; Schumacher, op. cit. supra note 12.
"Stewart v. United Electric Light & Power Co., supra note 8, at 344, 65 Atl. at 54.
'Bowes v. City of Boston, 155 Mass. 344, 29 N. E. 633 (892); McVey v. Illinois
Central R. R., 73 Miss. 487, 19 So. 209 (895) ; Johnson v. Eau Claire, i49 Wis. 194, 135 N.
W. 481 (1912). These courts state tha this satisfies the theory that but one suit may be
brought and one recovery be had.
"St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. v. Sweet, 63 Ark. 563, 40 S. W. 463 (897);
Maney v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., supra note 3; Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St.
Louis Ry. v. Hosea, 152 Ind. 412, 53 N. E. 419 (I899); Mahoning Valley Ry. v. Van
Alstine, supra note 12; Rowe v. Richards, supra note 12; Kohler v. Waukesha Milk Co., i9o
Wis. 52, 2o8 N. W. goi (igo6); Note (915) 28 HARv. L. REV. 802; (1915) i IOWA L.
BuLT. 2O5; Note (i928) 13 MINN. L. REV. 47; Note (1916) 64 U. OF PA. L. REv. 626.
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Much confusion can be observed in the cases arising under the Death Stat-
ute; there is no hope of securing any uniformity in decisions under the present
Acts.49 The courts by their decisions have reached results far removed from the
end sought by the statutes. Consequently protection has not been accorded to the
various parties in interest in many cases. To dispel this confusion, and to achieve
the equitable results contemplated by the Lord Campbell's Act and the survival
statutes, there should be a complete revision of these statutes by the legislatures.
The statutes are wholly inadequate in their present form.
O.B.G.
STATE POWERS OVER RAILROADS UNDER THE TRANSPORTATION ACT-In
changing the function of the Interstate Commerce Commission from the nega-
tive one of preventing unfair discrimination on the part of the common carriers
to the positive one of building and maintaining an adequate transportation sys-
tem, the Transportation Act of 192o inaugurated a new policy.2 This policy
together with the fact that the instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate com-
merce are identical and their operations interblended, or "inextricably inter-
twined", 3 presaged an unprecedented encroachment by the Federal Government
upon the state powers over railroads. The extent of this encroachment and its
constitutionality can be definitely determined only when the provisions of the
Act have been tested by litigation and finally adjudicated 4-- a process that can
prove extremely slow and tedious, as witness the "recent" case of Atchison, T.
& S. F. Ry. v. Railroad Commission.5 An examination of the decisions bear-
ing upon the amended Interstate Commerce Act shows that the Supreme Court
is determined that, whatever other obstacles may hinder the Commission in
carrying out this policy, an extreme judicial consideration for and deference to
states' rights shall not be one of them. With the effect of those provisions
enabling the Commission to build up railroads by the control of rates on the
one hand, and to limit their expenditures by the control and regulation of the
"For a survey of existing statutes, see Legis. (ig3i) 44 HARv. L. Rlv. 98o.
141 STAT. 456 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 71-74, 76-78, and 141 (1926). In amending the
Act to Regulate Commerce, the Transportation Act changed its title to the Interstate Com-
merce Act, but preserved the original section numbers. The references in this note will be
to the sections of the Interstate Commerce Act.
2"... The Transportation Act adds a new and important object to previous interstate
commerce legislation which was designed primarily to prevent unreasonable or discriminatory
rates against persons and localities. The new act seeks affirmatively to build up a system of
railways prepared to handle promptly all the interstate traffic of the country. It aims to give
the owners of thQ railways an opportunity tc) earn enough to maintain their properties and
equipment in such a state of efficiency that they can well carry this burden. To achieve this
great purpose, it puts the railroad systems of the country more completely than ever under
the fostering guardianship and control of the Commission, which is to supervise their issue
of securities, their car supply and distribution, their joint use of terminals, their construction
of new lines, their abandonment of old lines, and by a proper division of joint rates, and by
fixing adequate rates for, interstate commerce, and in case of discrimination, for intrastate
commerce, to secure a fair return upon the properties of the carriers engaged." Taft, C. J.,
Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456 at 478, 44 Sup. Ct. 169 at 172
(1924). See also New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, I89, 43 Sup. Ct. 270, 273
(0923).
( See 2 SHARFmAw, THxa INTERsTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (931)' 214, 220; Colo-
rado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153, 164, 46 Sup. Ct. 452, 454 (1926).
'"This enterprise of pricking out the dividing line between state and national powers is
essentially a governmental one. The final authority in the process is a governmental agency,
though not an executive or legislative one. This agency, however, depends for stimulation
and guidance upon litigants who appear before it. . . .. To a large extent our public issues
in this field are settled in private litigation." Powell, Current Conflicts between the Com-
nerce Clause and State Police Power, 1922-z927 (1928) 12 MINN. L. REV. 6o7, 631.
'283 U. S. 380, 51 Sup. Ct. 555 (1931).
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issuance of securities, and construction and abandonment of lines on the other,
this note is chiefly concerned.
One of the early queries raised by many writers 6 as to the effect of the
Act upon the federal control of intrastate rates was speedily and summarily
answered by the Supreme Court in Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chi-
cago, B. & Q. R. R.7  Prior to the Act the Interstate Commerce Commission
had no power to order a general revision of intrastate rates but had the power
to deal only with such intrastate rates as caused unjust discrimination to par-
ticular persons or localities engaged in interstate commerce." In this case the
Commission pursuant to powers granted it by section I5a of the Act 9 to adjust
rates to enable carriers to earn "an aggregate annual net railway operating in-
come equal . . . to a fair return upon the aggregate value of the railway
property," ordered an upward revision of freight and passenger rates. The
Wisconsin Railroad Commission refused to raise intrastate passenger fares
above the maximum prescribed by state statute. The Interstate Commerce
Commission, finding that interstate commerce was unduly burdened, ordered the
intrastate rates raised. In upholding the Commission the Court declared that
the Act had empowered the Commission by section I5a to adjust rates. Although
that section gave it no power over intrastate rates, nevertheless it followed that
if intrastate rates were not raised so as to pay a fair proportionate share of
maintaining an adequate transportation system, interstate rates would have to
be raised and interstate commerce unduly burdened thereby. And the Com-
mission's power in such cases was expressly provided for by the new section
13, paragraph 4,10 which not only embodied the doctrine of the Shreveport
Case 11 as to preventing discrimination against particular places and localities,
but expressly stated that the Commission might prescribe rates when there was
6 See Bronaugh, Federal Control oji Intrastate Rates (1921) 24 LAw NOTES 187; Note
(1921) 21 COL. L. REV. 350; Note (1921) 69 U. OF PA. L. REV. 262.
7257 U. S. 563, 42 Sup. Ct. 232 (1922). This case was followed by New York v. United
States, 257 U. S. 591, 42 Sup. Ct. 239 (1922) in which a charter fare-limiting contract be-
tween a railroad and a state was set aside.
8
Acr To REGULATE COM f-RCE §3 (I), 24 STAT. 380 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. §3 (i)
(1929). Houston, East and West Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct.
833 (1914). See Bikl6, Federal Control of Intrastate Railroad Rates (1914) 63 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 69; Coleman, The Evolution of Federal Control of Ihtrastate Rates (1914) 28 H.v.
L, REv. 34.
' "In the exercise of its power to prescribe just and reasonable rates the Commission
shall initiate, modify, establish or adjust such rates so that carriers as a whole . . . will
under honest, efficient and economical management and reasonable expenditures . . . earn
an aggregate net railway operating income equal, as nearly as may be, to 4 fair return upon
the aggregate value of the railway property of such carriers held for and used in the service
of transportation: Provided, that the Commission shall have reasonable latitude to modify
or adjust any particular rate which it may find to be unjust or unreasonable, and to pre-
scribe different rates for different sections of the country." INTERSTATE CoMmERi C AcT
§ 15a (2), 41 STAT. 488 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § i5a (2) (1926).
11 "Whenever in any such investigation the Commission, after full hearing, finds that
any such rate, fare, charge . . . causes any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference,
or prejudice as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce-on the one hand and in-
-terstate or foreign commerce on the other hand, or any undue, unreasonable, or unjust dis-
crimination, against interstate or foreign commerce, which is hereby forbidden and declared to
be unlawful, it shall prescribe the rate, fare, or charge, or the maximum or minimum, or
the maximum and minimum thereafter to be charged . . . in such manner as, in its judg-
ment, will remove such advantage, preference, prejudice, or discrimination. Such rates, fares,
charges . . . shall be observed while in effect by the carriers parties to such proceedings,
affected thereby, the law. of any State or the decision or order of any State authority to
the contrary notwithstanding." Ibid. § 13 (4), 41 STAT. 484, 49 U. S. C. A. § 15a (4).
(Italics the writer's.)
' Supra note 8.
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"any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign
commerce." 12
In addition to empowering the Commission to prescribe fair rates, section
15a, paragraphs 5 to 17, provides that if any carrier chanced to acquire an
income in excess of a fair return, it shall hold such earnings in trust for the
United States, one-half of which is to be paid over to the Commission to be
maintained as a general railroad revolving fund. 13 In upholding the validity
of these provisions, commonly known as the "recapture clause", the Supreme
Court found little difficulty in holding that they applied to earnings from intra-
state, as well as interstate, commerce. It was just another case of intrastate
commerce being incidentally and partially controlled in order that interstate
commerce might be adequately maintained.1
4
The inroads into state powers over rates and income from intrastate rates
were paralleled by the invasions caused by the Commission's exercising its
powers in regulating and limiting the carriers' expenditures, and otherwise
keeping interstate commerce free and unhampered. For instance, railroads
being corporations created by the state are normally, like other corporations,
subject to state regulation. Section 2oa, however, provides that no carder
should issue any shares of stock, bonds or other evidence of indebtedness with-
out the approval of the Commission; and the Commission's approval having
been obtained, no other approval is necessary. 1" And by these provisions, which
the Commission had long insisted were necessary if railroad securities were
to be safe and profitable,'0 state statutes purporting to regulate the issue of
securities are held to be superseded.'
7
' Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 257 U. S. 563 at 586, 42
Sup. Ct. 232 at 237 (1922). See Note (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 87o; Note (1922) 35 HARV. L.
REv. 864; (1922) 20 MicH. L. Ray. 675.
But an order of the Commission establishing statewide intrastate rates will not be sus-
tained in the absence of findings of esential facts as to the effect of the intrastate rates, both
as existing and as prescribed, upon the income of the carrier. Florida v. United States, 282
U. S. 194, 51 Sup. Ct. 119 (1930).
INTERsTATE COmmERci Acr.§ I5a (5) to (17), 41 STAT. 489-49I (1920), 49 U. S. C.
A. § ISa (1926).
" Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct. 169 (1923).
See (1923) 37 HARV. L. REv. 152. The principal holding of the Court was that such a pro-
vision did not constitute a taking of private property without due process. As to this aspect,
see Bunn, The Recapture of Earnings Provisions of the Transportation Act (1923) 32
YALE L. J. 213.
""From and after one hundred and twenty days after this section takes effect it shall
be unlawful for any carrier to issue any share of capital stock or any bond or other evidence
of: interest in or indebtedness of( the carrier (hereinafter in this section collectively termed
'securities') or to assume any obligation or liability as lessor, lessee, guarantor, indorser,
surety, or otherwise, in respect of the securities of any other person, natural or artificial,
even though permitted by the authority creating the corporation unless or until and then only
to the extent that, upon application by the carrier, and after investigation by the Commission
of the purposes and uses of the proposed issue and the proceeds thereof, or of the proposed
assumption of obligation or liability in respect of the securities of any other person, natural
or artificial, the Commission by order authorizes such issue or assumption. . . ." INTER-
sTATE. CommExc Acr § 2oa (2), 41 STAT. 494-495 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 2oa (2) (1926)1
"The jurisdiction conferred upon the Commission by this section shall be exclusive and
plenary,1 and a carrier may issue securities and assumq. obligations and liabilities in accord-
ance with the provisions of this section without securing approval other than as specified
herein." Ibid. § 2oa (7), 41 STAT. 495, 49 U. S. C. A. § 2oa (7).
1" See Burgess, Federal Regulation of Railway Management and Finance (1924) 37
HARV. L. REv. 705, 721-722.
7 Minneapolis, St. Paul and Sault Sainte Marie Ry. v. Railroad Commission of Wiscon-
sin, 183 Wis. 47, 197 N. W. 352 (1924) ; Public Service Commission v. Northern Cent. Ry.,
140 Md. 58o, 127 AtI. 112 (1925). This section had previously been held to be constitu-
tional. Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 293 Fed. IOOI (Ct. of App.
D. C. 1923), appeal dismissed, 266 U. S. 640, 45 Sup. Ct. 124 (1924).
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Again, to prevent the railroads from making unnecessary expenditures where
no securities would have to be issued and to insure adequate service where, and
only where, necessary, the amended Act provides that no carrier subject to the
provisions of the act shall construct a new railroad or extend an old one or
abandon all or any portion of its railroad without having first secured from
the Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and
necessity required such construction or abandonment; Is and that the Commis-
sion might require a carrier, under certain circumstances "to extend its line or
lines". 19 Although the Supreme Court early declared that under these provi-
sions the Commission had no jurisdiction to authorize the abandonment of serv-
ice wholly intrastate, where the road was not connected by common ownership
with interstate commerce,'20 in Colorado v. United States," the Court held that
under this section the Commission bad authority to permit a railroad operating
interstate and intrastate to abandon its intrastate service, where continued oper-
ation would unduly burden interstate commerce. In regulating interstate com-
merce Congress "may determine to what extent and in what manner intrastate
service must be subordinated in order that interstate service may be adequately
rendered." 22 The Commission likewise has jurisdiction where the construction
is wholly intrastate, 23 unless the circumstances clearly show that interstate com-
merce will not be affected. 4
These provisions were also largely involved in determining the Commis-
sion's jurisdiction over physical connections between interstate carriers. Prior
to the Transportation Act, the power of the states to order a physical connec-
tion made between the tracks of contiguous or intersecting railroads engaged
in interstate and intrastate commerce was universally upheld . 5  But in Alaban
& V. Ry. v. Jackson & E. Ry.,26 the Supreme Court in reversing a judgment
of the Mississippi Supreme Court which had approved the order of a state
commission authorizing one carrier to exercise the right of eminent domain to
'INTERSTATE COMMERCE AcT §1 (I8), 41 STAT. 477 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. §I (18)
(1926).
"Ibid. § i (21), 41 STAT. 478, 49 U. S. C. A. § 1 (21). Par. (ig) deals with the proce-
dure; par. (2o) privides that the Commission may issue the certificates permitting the con-
struction in whole or in part, and provides penalties for any unlawful construction or aban-
donment; par. (22) provides that the authority of the Commission "shall not extend to the
construction or abandonment of spur, industrial, team, switching, or sidetracks located or to
be located wholly within one state."
Because of the insertion by Congress of par. (22), the Supreme Court held, in Western
& A. Ry. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 267 U. S. 493, 45 Sup. Ct. 409 (1925), that
an order of a state commission to continue to furnish switching service on an industrial
siding was valid, though eighty-five per cent. of the traffic over the industrial track in ques-
tion was interstate.
I Texas v. Eastern Texas Ry., 258 U. S. 204, 42 Sup. Ct. 281 (1922). See Note (1922)
i TEx. L. REv. 97.
2-271 U. S. 153, 46 Sup. Ct. 452 (1926). Cf. the recent case of Transit Commission v.
United States, 284 U. S. 360, 52 Sup. Ct. 157 (1932).
"Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153, 166, 46 Sup. Ct. 452, 454 (1926).
" Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Gulf, etc., Ry., 270 U. S. 266, 46 Sup. Ct. 263 (1926).
"Texas & N. 0. Ry. v. Northside Belt Ry., 276 U. S. 475, 48 Sup. Ct. 361 (1928) (ter-
minal railway, five miles long, from a private plant to another local railroad).
Wisconsin, Minn. & Pac. Ry. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287 (1900). See Note (1922) 22
A. L. R. lo78.
2271 U. S. 244, 46 Sup. Ct. 535 (1926). See Note (1924) 37 HARv. L. RrV. 888;
(1927) 11 MINN. L. REV. 164.
Cf. People v. Public Service Commission, 233 N, Y. 113, 135 N. E. 195 (1922), where
the New York Court of Appeals held that the Act of 192o had given the Commission ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the construction of physical connections, but based its decision on
§ 3 (3) which orders carriers to "afford all reasonable, proper and equal facilities for the
interchange of traffic between their respective lines," a provision which, however, is not new,
but goes back to 1887. AcT TO REGULATE COMMERCE, February 4, 1887, 24 STAT. 380, 49
U. S. C. A. §3 (3) (1929) •
secure a connection with the tracks of another, held that this power over the
construction' of such junctions had been vested by the Transportation Act ex-
clusively in the Interstate Commerce Commission. In so holding, the Court
conceded that there was no amendment specifically conferring exclusive power
over physical connections between railroads engaged in interstate commerce,
but stressed the fact that no railroad could extend its lines without a certificate,
and that the Commission might require a carrier to extend its lines and also that,
under paragraph 4 of section 3,27 the Commission might require one carrier to
permit another to use its terminal facilities "including main line track or tracks
for a reasonable distance outside of such terminals." And the court concluded
that its comprehensive powers included such projects. It is perhaps significant
that the court went further than the facts required. The only question before
it was whether the Commission's authorization was necessary to construct a
connection whether the railroad was asking or the state ordering. It was not
necessary to rule that the state was no longer empowered to make the order
subject to the Commission's approval.
Contrasted with this attitude, the decision of the Supreme Court in the
recent case of Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Railroad Conmission,28 placing its
stamp of approval on the proposition that the Interstate Commerce Commission
may not order but merely acquiesce in the construction of joint terminal sta-
tions, appears a model of moderation. This case has had a long and tortuous
history, largely due to the confusing opinion rendered by the Supreme Court
,of the United States when the issue was first before it in 1924.29 The contro-
versy originated in 1921, when the California Railroad Commission ordered
the Southern Pacific, the Atchison, Topeka, and Sante Fe, and the Los Angeles
and Salt Lake Railway Companies to eliminate certain grade crossings and to
acquire ground for the building of a union terminal station. Prior to the
Transportation Act there was no question as to the power of the state railroad
commissions to make such orders.30 But the Supreme Court of California, in an
elaborate opinion, held that under the terms of the amendatory act of 1920, full
power and authority over the matter of union terminal depot facilities of inter-
state roads had been vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission, and that
the Railroad Commission had been divested of the power, authority, and juris-
diction over the subject. Although the Act made no specific provision as to
the construction of terminals, the Court felt that the comprehensive scope
given the Commission, together with the provisions that no extension of lines
could be made without its approval,3 1 that it could require extension of lines 32
and the joint use of terminals, 33 embodied such projects.3 4 The Railroad Com-
2 INTERSTATE COMMERcE Act §3 (4), 41 STAT. 479 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. §3 (4)
(1926).'Supra note 5.
2 Southern Pac. Ry. v. Railroad Commission of California, 264 U. S. 331, 44 Sup. Ct.
376 (1924).
" Grand Trunk Ry. v. Michigan Ry. Commission, 231 U. S. 457, 34 Sup. Ct. 152 (1913).
Railroad Commission of Alabama v. Alabama Great Southern Ry., 185 Ala. 354, 64 So. 13,
L. R. A. 1915D 98. See Los Angeles Passenger Terminal Cases, IOo I. C. C. 421, 426
(1925).Supra note IS.
= Supra note 19.
nINTERSTATE COMmERCE ACE § 3 (4), 41 STAT. 479 (I920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 3 (4)
(1926).
'Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Railroad Commission, 190 Cal. 214, 211 Pac. 46o (1922).
See (1924) 12 CALIF. L. REV. 221.
In Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. State, 9o Okla. 173, 217 Pac. 147 (1923), decided
shortly afterward, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that under the Act of 1920 a state
still possessed authority to require the construction of a union terminal station. The court
emphasized the fact that, granted that the Commission had been given the power, it had not
acted, and that section I, paragraph (18) provided that "nothing in thisact shall impair or
NOTES ,1005
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mission appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, whence came the
confusing decision which required seven years' litigation to clarify its meaning.35
As the Court insisted years later,36 the only question before it was whether
a union station could be built without the Commission's acquiescing by issuing
a certificate of convenience and necessity. But the issue was -by no means so
clearly stated at the time. For one thing, the Court affirmed the decision of
the California Supreme Court to the effect that the State Commission was di-
vested of all power, and that that power was vested in the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Again it prefaced its opinion with the remark: "Our only ques-
tion here is whether the power to direct a new union station with its essential
incidents is committed exclusively to the Interstate Commerce Commission by
the Act of 1920." s, And, although in the latter part of the opinion the Court
appears to base its decision on the necessity of getting the Commission's ap-
proval under the statute because of the "substantial and expensive extension
of the main tracks" involved, one might readily be forgiven for believing that
the Court held that the Commission had exclusive power to order the construc-
tion of union stations.38
Yet five years later, chastened by two lucid opinions of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission,su the Supreme Court in upholding the decision of the Com-
mission that it had not the power to order the construction of a terminal station
although it would issue certificates to the effect that the public convenience and
necessity required the extension of tracks necessary, and that the carriers' ability
to serve the public would be unimpaired, disavowed any intent to hold that the
Commission could order such construction, and declared that it merely held that
the union depot could not be constructed unless the Commission acquiesced.
40
The decision is undoubtedly correct. As the Commission pointed out,
41
there was no "language in the act apt for the purpose"; the provision in para-
graph 4 of section 3,42 for joint use of terminal facilities, expressly covered only
affect the right of a state, in the exercise of its police power, to require just and reasonable
freight and passenger service for intrastate business, except in so far as such requirement
is inconsistent with any lawful order of the Commission." See (1924) 10 VA. L. REv. 238.
Supra note 29.
Interstate Commerce Commission v. United States, 280 U. S. 52 at 71, 5o Sup. Ct. 53
at 57 (1929).
Supra note 29, at 341, 44 Sup. Ct. at 377 (1924).
* For such an interpretation of the Court's opinion, see Powell, op. cit. supra note 4, at
614; Note (1924) 37 HAxv. L. RExV. 888, 891. See also the opinion of Commissionerl East-
man, in Los Angeles Passenger Terminal Cases, 142 I. C. C. 489, 5oo-5O1 (1928). And see
Interstate Commerce Commission v. United States, supra note 36, in which this decision was
cited in the briefs of opposing counsel to the effect that the Commission had and had not
exclusive power over the construction of union terminal stations.
'Los Angeles Passenger Terminal Cases, IOO I. C. C. 42 (1925); 142 I. C. C. 489
(1928). While the Atchison case was being appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States, the city of Los Angeles petitioned the Interstate Commerce Commission to require
the railroads to construct the station. The Commission held that it was powerless to do so,
but in accordance with its interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision, found that the
public convenience and necessity required the extension of lines necessary to the establish-
ment of the station, and that the expense would not impair the ability of the roads to per-
form their respective duties to the public. The Commission issued the certificates, however,
only, after, the Railroad Commission had, at its suggestion, made suitable finding and orders,
and again refused the petition to ordert the construction of the said station. The Supreme
Cotrt upheld this decision, supra note 36, reversing the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia, to which the city of -Los Angeles had applied for a mandamus against the Com-
mission, 34 F. (2d) 228 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1929). Thereafter the Railroad Commission of
California ordered the construction, and was upheld by the Supreme Court of California.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Railroad Commission, 209 Cal. 460, 288 Pac. 775 (193o), aff'd,
283 U. S. 380, 51 Sup. Ct. 555 (1931).
" Supra note 36.
"Los Angeles Passenger Terminal Cases, ioo I. C. C. 421, 426 (0925).
'" Supra note 33.
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facilities existing when the requirement was made; and paragraph 21 of section
I,43 authorizing the Commission to require the carrier to extend its line orlines.
relates to vehicles used in the.transportation of property, and does not empower
the Commission to order the construction of a union passenger station per se.
In making this distinction which so profoundly influenced the Supreme
Court, 4  between requiring the construction of a union station, and authorizing
the construction by a finding that the public convenience and necessity required
the extension of the tracks and that the expense would not impair the carriers'
ability to serve the public, the Commission would seem to have accurately inter-
preted the statute. Power is one thing, approval another. The state commis-
sions were not ousted of their jurisdiction; their orders were merely subjected
to the approval of the Commission. Such a division of jurisdiction is not only
logical but desirable, and but another indication that the maximum efficiency
can be attained from the cooperation of the state commissions and the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the one carefully considering local needs, the other not-
ing the effects of desired changes upon the system as a whole.45 Such a com-
promise may well point the way to the ending of the conflict arising out of the
federal and state regulations not only of railroads but of other instrumentalities
as well.48 If, as the Supreme Court constantly insists, interstate and intrastate
commerce are so "inextricably intertwined", it is fitting and proper that those
intrusted with the management of each respectively should cooperate wherever
possible.
R.J.C.
'INTEIRSTATE COMMERcE AcT § 1 (2), 41 STAT. 478 (i920), 49 U. S. C. A. § I (21)
(1926).
"Although the Commission was purporting to interpret the Supreme Court's decision,
it is probable that the Supreme Court never thought of the distinction between the state
requiring, on the one hand, and the Commission approving, on the other. It seemed to be
thinking; in terms of exclusive jurisdiction. See Alabama Ry. v. Jackson & E. Ry., supra
note 26, where the Court failed to take advantage of an excellent opportunity for making
such a distinction.
"See Powell, Current Comflicts between the Commerce Clause and State Police Power,
1922-1927 (928) 12 MINN. L. REv. 321, 338, where in commenting on the decision in St.
Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 261 U. S, 369, 46 Sup. Ct. 380
(z923), which held that certain interstate trains could not be compelled to stop at a small
town in Missouri, the writer laments that such petty matters should still go to the Supreme
Court, and suggests that the Interstate Commerce Commission be vested with power to
approve and condemn the orders of state commissions on such matters.
"1 See, for instance, the report of Attorney-Examiner Flynn, of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, "Control of Railroad and Motor Transportation", Docket No. 23,400, where, at
sheet 129 et seq., he recommends that the "administration of the regulation of motor vehicles
operating in interstate commerce should be vested in the Interstate Commission." But "where
the common carrier motor-carrieri operations involved are or are proposed to be conducted
in not more than three states, matters relating to the issuance of certificates of convenience
and necessity; transfer or revocation of certificates; consolidations, mergers, and acquisition
of control, complaints as to rates, fares, charges, and service, should be referred to joint
boards composed of representatives of the states in which such motor-carrier operations are
or are proposed to be conducted for hearing and recommendation of appropriate orders."
